Case Digest: Friedhelm Eronat v CNPC International (Chad) Ltd and another [2025] EWCA 1054

<center><span class="news-text_italic-underline">Judgment Date: 1 August 2025</span></center>

‍

Background

The parties’ contract contained an LCIA arbitration clause providing that an appeal on a question of law could be filed in the 30 days after “the decision is rendered”. The clause also purported to allow appeals on fact and excluded the right to bring applications under sections 67 and 68 of the <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Arbitration Act 1996</span> (“<span class="news-text_medium">AA 1996</span>”).

An LCIA tribunal rendered its award and the LCIA delivered it to the parties at a later date. The claimant filed a section 69 application within 30 days of delivery but outside of the 30 days from the date of the  award. The Commercial Court rejected the application as out of time and the claimant sought permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

Decision

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that the contractual thirty-day period ran from the date of the award, not its delivery. Males LJ, giving the leading judgment, emphasised:

• The contractual provisions had substantive effect in substituting a 30-day limit for the 28-day limit in section 70(3) AA 1996 and in allowing a section 69 appeal without needing the court’s permission under section 69(2)(b). However, the provisions permitting appeals on fact and excluding challenges under sections 67 and 68 were either ineffective or inconsistent with the mandatory provisions of the AA 1996.
• The wording “rendered” could, in isolation, refer to either the date of the award or its delivery. However, references in the contract and in the LCIA and ICC Rules in force when the contract was made indicated that an award is “rendered” when it is made by the tribunal.
• This interpretation aligned with the AA 1996, which distinguishes between the making of an award (section 54) and its notification (section 55). The statutory time limits for appeal also run from the date of the making of the award.

The Court also held that the parties’ waiver of rights excluded the ability to seek an extension of time under section 79(1) AA 1996. Even if such an application were possible, Bryan J had been correct in the Commercial Court to state he would not have granted relief and under section 79(6) because there was no jurisdiction to appeal that refusal without permission from the lower court.

Implications

The decision confirms that where parties agree a contractual timeline for appeals, the period will run from the date the award is made unless the contract expressly provides otherwise. It also illustrates the limits on party autonomy under the AA 1996, with attempts to exclude mandatory rights of challenge or to allow appeals on fact being ineffective. Parties must therefore take care to calculate deadlines for challenges from the award date rather than from notification, to avoid applications being struck out as out of time.