English Commercial Court Confirms No Jurisdiction to Stay Arbitration Pending Arbitrator Challenges

In <span class="news-text_italic-underline">A v B [2026] EWHC 327 (Comm)</span>, the English Commercial Court dismissed an application seeking to prevent the continuation of arbitration proceedings while challenges to the arbitrator and certain procedural decisions were pending. The claimant applied under CPR Part 3 for an order staying two London-seated LCIA arbitrations until the determination of applications made under section 24 of the <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Arbitration Act 1996</span> (the “<span class="news-text_medium">AA 1996</span>”), seeking removal of the sole arbitrator in each arbitration and under section 68 of the AA 1996, seeking to set aside procedural decisions of the arbitrator.

Those decisions concerned the arbitrator’s refusal to consolidate the arbitrations and to permit the oral examination of witnesses. The arbitration agreements in question provided that the disputes were to be resolved on the basis of documentary evidence alone.

The application relied on the court’s general case management powers under CPR rule 3.1. However, Butcher J held that CPR rule 3.1(2)(g), which allows the court to stay proceedings, applies exclusively to court proceedings and does not extend to arbitral proceedings. In substance, the claimant was seeking an injunction to restrain the arbitrations pending the outcome of the section 24 and section 68 applications.

The learned judge emphasised that section 1(c) of the AA 1996 establishes the principle that the court should not intervene in an arbitration except as expressly permitted by the AA 1996. In this context, section 24(3) of the AA 1996 expressly provides that arbitration proceedings may continue while an application to remove an arbitrator is pending. The AA 1996 contains no provision enabling the court to suspend the progress of an arbitration pending the resolution of such applications.

Against that statutory background, Butcher J expressed doubt as to whether the court had any jurisdiction to halt the arbitrations. In any event, he held that even if such jurisdiction existed, it would only be exercisable in exceptional circumstances, such as where the continuation of the arbitration would be vexatious, oppressive, or unconscionable. Those conditions were not met in this case. The potential duplication of time and costs was not considered exceptional, nor was the argument that written questions to witnesses might reveal lines of questioning in the event oral cross-examination was later permitted.

The Court further noted that established case law confirmed that courts generally lack jurisdiction to interfere with the procedural conduct of an arbitration before an award has been issued. The decisions challenged by the claimant were procedural orders governing the conduct of the arbitration, rather than interim awards determining substantive rights. If any serious irregularity ultimately arose from the procedure adopted, the claimant’s remedies lay in challenging the final award or pursuing the removal of the arbitrator. Those rights were not undermined by allowing the arbitrations to continue.

Although the application was described as misconceived, the judgment provides a clear and concise reaffirmation of a fundamental principle of English arbitration law: the autonomy of arbitral proceedings and the limited scope of judicial intervention prior to the issuance of an award.

<span class="news-text_medium">Case:</span> <span class="news-text_italic-underline">A v B [2026] EWHC 327 (Comm)</span>, 30 January 2026 (Butcher J).