In the recent case of <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Mobile Telecommunications Company KSCP v HRH Prince Hussam Bin Saud Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud [2025] EWHC 85 (Ch)</span>, the court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to make a bankruptcy order against Prince Hussam Bin Saud, citing a lack of evidence to confirm that he had a place of residence in England and Wales within the relevant period under section 265(2)(b)(i) of the <span class="news-text_italic-underline">Insolvency Act 1986</span> ("<span class="news-text_medium">IA 1986</span>”). This case clarifies the interpretation of residence requirements for bankruptcy petitions.
The case stemmed from various arbitration awards, where a bankruptcy petition was presented against Prince Hussam Bin Saud, a prominent figure in Saudi Arabia. The petitioners contended Prince Hussam was living in England and Wales, relying on his historical residence at York House in London, where he stayed during his time at the London School of Economics in the 1980s. The properties in question were said to be purchased with the ongoing support of Prince Hussam's family.
However, following significant changes to his role in Saudi Arabia, including his appointment as Emir of Al Bahah and his increased security requirements, Prince Hussam had not resided in the UK during the relevant period. The petitioner, despite alleging Prince Hussam’s continuing use of properties in London, failed to demonstrate that Prince Hussam had maintained a residence in the jurisdiction during the three-year period before the petition was presented.
The court considered a variety of factors in determining whether Prince Hussam had a place of residence in the UK. These included his historical use of York House, the purpose of the properties, the presence of personal items, his mother's ongoing commitment to providing accommodation and the lack of his physical presence in the jurisdiction during the relevant period. Despite these factors, the court found that the petitioner did not meet the burden of proof to establish that Prince Hussam had a place of residence at the time the petition was filed.
The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that once an individual is found to have had a residence, they must demonstrate abandonment to no longer be considered a resident. Instead, the court emphasised that the question of residence is one of "fact and degree", dependent on the totality of the evidence and concluded that Prince Hussam’s lifestyle and absence from the jurisdiction during the relevant period meant that he did not have a residence in England and Wales for the purposes of the IA 1986.
This case highlights the jurisdictional tests for a creditor’s bankruptcy petition under the IA 1986, focusing specifically on the requirement of having a place of residence in the jurisdiction within the three years prior to the petition’s presentation. The court set out a five-part test to determine whether the debtor had a place of residence, emphasising the importance of permanence, continuity and the debtor's intention.
The ruling reinforces that jurisdiction in such cases is not automatic, even when an individual has occupied property in the past. The key question is whether there is sufficient evidence of a "place of residence" during the relevant period, which requires more than just property ownership or access. The court’s decision in this case sets a clear threshold for establishing jurisdiction based on residence.
This case serves as an important reminder of the complexities involved in determining jurisdiction for bankruptcy petitions, especially when the debtor’s residence is in question. It reinforces the need for petitioners to provide clear evidence of a debtor’s residence during the relevant period. The court’s decision to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds highlights the careful consideration required when interpreting "residence" under the IA 1986.
