<center><span class="news-text_italic-underline">Judgment Date: 10 December 2025</span></center>
The appeal arose from possession proceedings brought by Sandwell Borough Council against a tenant holding an introductory tenancy that commenced in March 2022 and was extended to September 2023. Allegations of noise nuisance and anti-social behaviour led the local authority to serve a notice terminating the tenancy in January 2023. Those proceedings were dismissed in October 2024 on the basis that the notice was invalid.
The time limit for appealing that decision expired on 20 November 2024. The local authority lodged appeal papers on 18 November 2024 but the court returned them on the basis that filing should have taken place through the High Court electronic filing system. Further documentation was filed on 28 November 2024 which the court recorded as the date the appeal was brought.
An extension of time was later granted although permission to appeal was refused. Fresh termination notices were served and a second possession claim was issued. In June 2025 a deputy district judge granted summary judgment to the tenant.
The local authority argued that electronic filing was not mandatory for an appeal from the County Court to the High Court and that the appeal had been brought in time. It also contended that the deputy district judge had failed to take proper account of the extension of time granted earlier.
The tenant argued that the second possession proceedings did not comply with the statutory framework and that the tenancy had ceased to be introductory because no valid appeal had been brought within time.
The appeal was allowed. The court was not satisfied that the procedural rules clearly required appeals from the County Court to the High Court to be filed electronically under the electronic working pilot scheme. There was a lack of clarity in the relevant practice directions and no express reference to Part 52 appeals. In those circumstances, paper filing in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules was permissible.
The court held that the appeal had been filed on 18 November 2024 which was within the applicable time limit. A subsequent extension of time was required because the appeal had not been issued by the court when it should have been and not because the appeal was late. The deputy district judge had therefore erred in concluding that the appeal was out of time.
Although not determinative of the outcome the court considered the status of the tenancy. Once an introductory tenancy ceases it cannot revert to that status. A judicial decision extending time to appeal cannot override the statutory provisions governing the transition from an introductory to a secure tenancy. The appeals process operates independently of the statutory tenancy regime.
The decision highlights continuing uncertainty around electronic filing requirements for appeals and confirms that where the rules do not clearly mandate electronic filing compliance with the traditional filing provisions may suffice. It also reinforces the notion that an appeal is brought when it is properly filed and not when it is later processed by the court.
