Jurisdiction: China | Second Edition 2025

Mainland China has historically relied on institutional arbitration, with ad hoc proceedings neither formally recognised under the PRC Arbitration Law nor widely practised. In recent years, however, a gradual opening has taken place. The first step was the Supreme People’s Court’s (“SPC”) 2016 Opinions on Judicial Support for Pilot Free Trade Zones, which introduced the “Three Specific Elements.” These allowed enterprises registered in designated zones to resolve disputes through ad hoc arbitration, provided arbitrators met statutory qualifications, mutually agreed rules were adopted and the arbitration was seated in a designated Mainland location.

Following this, Zhuhai Hengqin in Guangdong Province became the first to issue dedicated ad hoc arbitration rules. Momentum grew further with the 2021 Consultation Draft of the Revised PRC Arbitration Law, which proposed allowing ad hoc arbitration in foreign-related commercial disputes, igniting a national debate on whether China might ultimately embrace this model.

Regional Pioneers – Shanghai and Hainan

Shanghai has been at the forefront of experimentation. In August 2024, it rendered the country’s first foreign-related maritime ad hoc arbitral award in a dispute between two Shanghai-registered enterprises. The parties chose ad hoc arbitration, set their own procedures and appointed a maritime expert as sole arbitrator. This case showcased Shanghai’s ambition to position itself as an international arbitration hub.

Supporting this development, municipal authorities, including the Standing Committee of the Shanghai People’s Congress and the High People’s Court, have issued legislative and policy documents to build a legal framework for ad hoc arbitration in foreign-related commercial and maritime disputes. Parties seated in Shanghai can now design their own procedures or adopt existing institutional rules and arbitrators can be drawn from the Shanghai Arbitration Association (“SAA”), registered institutions, or beyond. Judicial support is also available for issues such as interim measures, validity of agreements and enforcement of awards.

Hainan followed closely, achieving its first ad hoc arbitration in July 2024 under provincial legislation. The framework permits ad hoc proceedings for disputes involving enterprises registered in Hainan or with foreign enterprises, including those in Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. Parties can select one or three arbitrators, agree on procedures and seek interim measures from local courts. The legislation also provides mechanisms for judicial assistance in evidence collection, agreement validity reviews and enforcement.

The Greater Bay Area has also played a pioneering role. In 2020, Shenzhen introduced regulations to expand ad hoc arbitration beyond free trade zones to special economic zones. Zhuhai followed in 2021, authorising its local arbitration body to provide services for ad hoc proceedings.

Institutional Support for Ad Hoc Arbitration

China’s leading arbitral institutions are adapting to the trend. The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”) incorporated services for ad hoc arbitration into its 2025 rules, offering administrative support such as arbitrator appointments, award scrutiny and hearing facilities. The China Maritime Law Association (“CMLA”) also issued its own ad hoc arbitration rules in 2022, complemented by service rules from the China Maritime Arbitration Commission (“CMAC”). In 2023, CMAC even published a redacted ad hoc arbitral award under these rules, underscoring their practical application.

Interim Measures – Legal Gaps and Exceptions

One of the main challenges remains the absence of a unified statutory framework for interim measures in ad hoc arbitrations. Current PRC law does not generally extend court assistance to such proceedings, except in limited circumstances. Notably, under the Arrangement on Interim Measures between Hong Kong and Mainland China, parties seated in Hong Kong may apply for interim relief from Mainland courts—but only in institutional cases, excluding ad hoc arbitration. Maritime law provides another exception, allowing preservation of assets such as ships or cargo in extraterritorial maritime disputes, even if conducted ad hoc.

Enforcement Issues

For foreign ad hoc awards, enforcement is relatively clear. Article 543 of the SPC’s Interpretation of the Civil Procedure Law directs courts to treat foreign ad hoc awards the same as institutional awards. Indeed, in 2025 the SPC confirmed this approach in a guiding judgment enforcing a Swedish ad hoc award. Similarly, awards from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan may be recognised under existing cross-border arrangements.

For domestic ad hoc awards, however, enforcement is patchy. Only a few regions, such as Shanghai and Hainan, have created frameworks supporting recognition. The New York Convention also creates uncertainties: while Article 5 requires arbitration agreements to be valid under governing law, the PRC Arbitration Law only validates institutional arbitration agreements.

Awards issued under regional legislative frameworks (such as in Shanghai and Hainan) may satisfy Convention requirements, but those rendered under non-legislative rules (such as Hengqin or CMLA) face greater uncertainty. Enforcement of Mainland ad hoc awards in Hong Kong remains doubtful, as current arrangements apply only to awards recognised under the PRC Arbitration Law.

Conclusion – A Transitional Stage

The recent milestones in Shanghai and Hainan signal a significant step forward for ad hoc arbitration in China. The issuance of the first foreign-related maritime ad hoc award in 2024 has heightened expectations that ad hoc proceedings will increasingly be accepted nationwide. Encouragingly, these regional frameworks already embody hallmarks of international arbitration practice, such as party autonomy and robust judicial support.

Nevertheless, the absence of a national legal framework creates uncertainty, particularly concerning interim measures and enforcement of domestic awards. Until revisions to the PRC Arbitration Law codify ad hoc arbitration, parties may remain cautious in choosing it over institutional arbitration.

Looking ahead, legislative reform is expected to clarify the status of ad hoc arbitration in Mainland China. If successful, this would not only align China more closely with international standards but also further establish its role as a global arbitration hub.

The deal concerned Yongtong’s acquisition of a 50% stake in Huatai, signed in November 2018 and completed in March 2019. Yongtong operates upstream in the production and distribution of papaverine hydrochloride API (an active pharmaceutical ingredient), while Huatai is active downstream in the manufacture and sale of papaverine hydrochloride injections, which are used to widen blood vessels and improve circulation.

Despite the transaction being long closed and falling below the statutory thresholds, SAMR exercised its discretionary “call-in” power on 3 January 2025, opening a review into potential anti-competitive effects under its framework for vertical mergers.

SAMR’s Analysis

SAMR focused on three central issues:

• Foreclosure ability: Yongtong’s exclusive distribution agreement with a key API supplier gave it the ability to restrict supply to competing downstream manufacturers of papaverine hydrochloride injections.

• Foreclosure incentives: SAMR concluded that the merged entity would have strong incentives to foreclose rivals, given Huatai’s increased market share.

• Anti-competitive effects: Huatai’s market share rose from 25–30% to around 50%, while injection prices had surged — more than 400% in 2018 and a further 60% in 2019. SAMR attributed these market effects, in part, to the merger and the exclusive API arrangements.

On this basis, SAMR ordered the parties to unwind the merger, terminate the exclusive API distribution agreement and secured a commitment from Yongtong’s ultimate controller not to participate in any future concentration involving papaverine hydrochloride APIs or related injection products. This type of personal undertaking is unprecedented in Chinese merger control practice.

Commentary and Implications

SAMR’s decision underscores its willingness to review and prohibit transactions years after closing, even where the statutory filing thresholds are not triggered. It signals that in strategically important sectors — such as pharmaceuticals — SAMR prioritises substantive effects over formal thresholds.

The ruling highlights several key insights for businesses and investors:

• Threshold compliance is not enough: Simply falling below statutory filing thresholds does not guarantee immunity from scrutiny.

• Substantive assessment is critical: When structuring deals, companies must consider potential foreclosure, market share impact and sector sensitivities.

• Enforcement is expanding: SAMR is prepared to impose structural remedies (unwinding) and behavioural undertakings that may bind controllers beyond the transaction itself.

This case reflects SAMR’s growing assertiveness in merger control enforcement and introduces further jurisdictional uncertainty for investors in China. Companies contemplating acquisitions in regulated or sensitive industries should therefore prepare for heightened merger control risks, even for transactions not formally notifiable under the AML.

China’s Arbitration Law, enacted in 1995, provided the foundation for the country’s modern arbitration regime but has long been seen as outdated in several respects, particularly in comparison with international practice. After years of incremental judicial interpretations and regional pilot projects, the NPC Standing Committee has now passed a sweeping amendment designed to modernise the framework and make Chinese arbitration more attractive in the global dispute resolution market.

Scope of Foreign-Related Arbitration

The revised law makes significant strides in recognising international arbitration norms. It broadens the definition of foreign-related arbitration (Article 78) and, for the first time, formally introduces the concept of an arbitration “seat” (Article 81). The nationality of an arbitral award will henceforth be determined by the seat of arbitration—a key principle in international arbitration practice.

Another landmark reform is the limited acceptance of ad hoc arbitration. Under Article 82, ad hoc arbitration is permitted in foreign-related maritime disputes and for disputes between enterprises registered in pilot free trade zones (“FTZs”), the Hainan free trade port (“FTP”) and other designated areas. Additionally, Article 86 authorises foreign arbitration institutions to establish offices within FTZs and the Hainan FTP and to administer foreign-related cases, reinforcing China’s ambition to make these regions international arbitration hubs.

Procedural Innovations and Preservation Measures

The amendments introduce a range of procedural modernisations. Arbitration proceedings may now be conducted online by default, unless either party objects (Article 11). The law strengthens pre-arbitration preservation, explicitly allowing parties to apply to people’s courts for urgent preservation of property, evidence, or conduct before arbitration begins (Articles 39 and 58).

Tribunals are also empowered to seek assistance from administrative bodies to collect evidence (Article 55), addressing practical challenges in evidence-gathering that previously undermined efficiency. Together, these provisions aim to enhance both accessibility and effectiveness of arbitration in China.

Validity and Autonomy of Arbitration Agreements

Several provisions address persistent uncertainties around arbitration agreements. Article 30 clarifies that an arbitration agreement remains valid regardless of whether the underlying contract has been established, amended, terminated, revoked, or deemed void. Under Article 31, arbitral tribunals are expressly authorised to rule on the validity of arbitration agreements upon party application, while courts retain limited supervisory jurisdiction.

The law codifies judicial interpretations by stipulating that if one party alleges the existence of an arbitration agreement and the other does not object before the first hearing, the agreement will be deemed valid once the tribunal reminds the parties and records the acknowledgment (Article 27). This codification is designed to reduce procedural delays caused by challenges to the existence of arbitration clauses.

Additional Key Reforms

Beyond these headline changes, the amendment introduces a series of practical adjustments:

• clearer rules for service of arbitration documents (Article 41);

• expanded disclosure obligations for arbitrators (Article 45), bolstering transparency;

• stronger measures against fraudulent arbitration (Article 61);

• a shorter limitation period for applications to set aside awards—reduced from six months to three months from receipt of the award (Article 72);

• terminology reform, replacing “arbitration commission” with “arbitration institution” (Article 89) to align with international practice and simplify understanding.

Conclusion

The 2025 amendment represents a decisive step in the evolution of China’s arbitration framework. By addressing long-standing criticisms, particularly in relation to foreign-related arbitration, ad hoc proceedings and procedural flexibility, the reform strengthens China’s position as an arbitration venue. While questions remain regarding implementation and judicial support, especially for ad hoc arbitration, the changes bring the system closer to international standards and signal China’s determination to become a leading jurisdiction in global dispute resolution.

On 27 June 2025, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (“NPCSC”) approved extensive revisions to the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (“AUCL”). Coming into force on 15 October 2025, the amendments update the regime for safeguarding fair competition, reflecting evolving business realities—particularly in digital markets. While they promise a more equitable environment, they also demand heightened compliance from both domestic and foreign operators.

Enhanced Trademark Protections

The amended AUCL expands the scope of trademark protection. Businesses are prohibited from using another company’s product name, trade name (including abbreviations), registered mark, or well-known unregistered mark as search keywords in a manner that could mislead consumers about the origin of goods or suggest affiliation.

Digital identifiers—already recognised since 2017—are now broadened to cover social-media handles and app names, alongside domains and websites. Operators facilitating such deceptive practices, not only those directly engaging in them, are now held liable.

Penalties include:

• Compensation based on losses or unlawful gains, with statutory damages up to RMB 5 million (USD 697,798) where calculation is difficult.

• Orders to cease misconduct and confiscation of infringing goods.

• Fines up to five times illegal turnover if above RMB 50,000 (USD 69,779), or up to RMB 250,000 (USD 34,889) if below this threshold.

• Revocation of business licences in serious cases. Those who unknowingly sell infringing goods may avoid penalties if they prove lawful acquisition and disclose the source.

Expanded Trade Secret Protections

The law introduces new forms of trade secret misappropriation, including cyber intrusions. Liability extends to those inducing or assisting violations and now applies to individuals and non-business entities, not only operators.

The burden of proof has shifted: once a rights holder shows preliminary evidence of misappropriation, the accused must demonstrate that no infringement occurred. This significantly strengthens protection in fast-moving sectors vulnerable to leakage.

Stronger Digital Fair Competition Rules

The amendments expressly prohibit the misuse of data, algorithms, or platform rules to distort user choices or undermine rivals. Businesses are barred from fraudulent acquisition of competitors’ data, fake transactions, fabricated reviews, or instructing others to conduct such behaviour.

The definition of “acts of confusion” has been expanded, explicitly covering the unauthorised use of trademarks in both digital and offline contexts.

Protections for SMEs

Recognising vulnerabilities of smaller operators in platform economies, the AUCL now prohibits:

• Coercive pricing tactics forcing SMEs to sell below cost.

• Exploitation of bargaining power, such as delayed payments or one-sided contract terms.

• Violations can lead to fines up to RMB 1 million (USD 139,559), or up to RMB 5 million (USD 697,798) in serious cases.

Additional Provisions

• Reward promotions (Article 11): Once launched, the terms of reward programmes cannot be altered without just cause, aligning with prior interim rules.

• Commercial defamation (Article 12): The scope now covers instructing others to spread false or misleading information, including hiring agencies or influencers for malicious reviews or “reverse seeding”.

• Anti-bribery (Article 8): Liability applies to both giving and accepting bribes.

• False reviews (Article 9): Businesses are prohibited from assisting others in fabricating reviews or endorsements.

• Platform responsibility: Operators must integrate fair competition rules into agreements, provide reporting mechanisms, handle misconduct and notify regulators.

Extraterritorial Reach

The revised AUCL applies to conduct outside China that harms Chinese competitors or distorts its domestic market. This creates potential liability for foreign parents or affiliates if their overseas practices adversely affect competition in China.

Key Takeaways for Foreign Companies

• Expanded IP and trade secret protections provide stronger tools for enforcement.

• Compliance burdens increase: marketing, digital sales, data usage and third-party partnerships must be carefully monitored.

• Parent companies and affiliates abroad must be included in compliance reviews due to extraterritoriality.

• Platform operators face heightened duties of oversight and record-keeping.

• Businesses should reinforce internal controls, staff training and contractual arrangements to address anti-bribery and trade secret risks.

China has emerged as a global leader in artificial intelligence (“AI”), not only in terms of technological innovation but also in establishing a comprehensive regulatory framework. Since the launch of its Next Generation AI Development Plan (2017), the government has pursued a strategy of fostering innovation while exercising strict oversight to safeguard national security, social stability and ethical standards.

Recent regulatory milestones, from deep synthesis provisions to generative AI measures and mandatory AI education, reflect China’s determination to shape AI development in line with state priorities. This dual strategy of innovation and control has significant implications both domestically and internationally, as China’s model increasingly influences global debates on AI governance.

At the same time, these policies are increasingly setting benchmarks that reverberate beyond China’s borders, influencing how other major jurisdictions — the EU, UK and US — approach AI governance. This article examines China’s regulatory model, key milestones and its global implications, while drawing comparisons with other leading frameworks.

Strategic Vision for AI Development

China’s AI ambitions were formally articulated in the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, unveiled in 2017. This policy sets a target for China to become the world’s leading AI power by 2030, framing AI as integral to economic transformation and national security. The government seeks to embed AI as a fundamental driver of the country’s technological and economic future through long-term planning and centralised oversight.

Key Regulatory Milestones

China’s regulatory framework for AI has rapidly expanded since 2021, targeting both risks and opportunities in digital and data-driven technologies:

• Deep Synthesis Provisions (2023)

  Introduced on 10 January 2023, these rules regulate deep learning, virtual reality and other technologies used to generate synthetic content (including text, images, audio and video). The provisions apply across the entire content lifecycle — from creation to dissemination — and impose obligations on both providers and users. A central feature is mandatory labelling of deepfake content, aimed at curbing deception and misuse.

• Interim Measures for Generative AI Services (2023)

  In force since 15 August 2023, these measures apply to publicly available generative AI systems, such as large language models. Providers must secure government approval before releasing such systems and ensure outputs reflect Core Socialist Values. Content undermining national security or social order is prohibited.

• Generative AI Content Labelling (2025)

  Beginning in September 2025, all AI-generated content must be clearly labelled. This measure is designed to enhance transparency and public trust, aligning with global concerns over misinformation and authenticity in digital environments.

• Mandatory AI Education Initiatives (2025)

  Starting from the 2025 academic year, students at all levels will complete at least eight hours of AI education annually. This initiative aims to improve AI literacy, encourage innovation and prepare a workforce capable of navigating and contributing to AI-driven industries.

• Crackdown on AI-Generated Misinformation

  The China Securities Regulatory Commission has actively addressed AI-driven misinformation in financial markets. In collaboration with law enforcement, it has targeted fraudulent or manipulative content to safeguard investors and preserve market stability.

Balancing Innovation with Control

China’s approach reflects a dual strategy:

• Government Oversight: Algorithms and AI systems must undergo review to confirm alignment with state interests, ensuring outputs conform to political and ethical standards.

• Education as Regulation: Embedding AI training in the curriculum ensures a tech-literate population that develops AI within the framework of compliance.

• Misinformation Safeguards: Specific measures to counter AI-driven disinformation, particularly in finance, demonstrate how regulation is sector-specific as well as systemic.

Comparative Perspective: China, the EU, the UK and the US

China’s framework stands in contrast to the EU’s and UK’s evolving approaches:

• China: A centralised, effects-based regime. Binding regulations target specific technologies such as deep synthesis and generative AI. Strict obligations include algorithm filing, security assessments and mandatory content labelling. Innovation is promoted but remains closely tethered to political, ethical and national security standards.

• European Union AI Act: A comprehensive, horizontal regulation adopting a risk-tiered system. Prohibited uses (for example, social scoring) are banned. High-risk systems must undergo rigorous conformity assessments, data governance checks and human oversight requirements. General-purpose AI and foundation models are subject to additional transparency and systemic-risk obligations.

• United Kingdom: A principles-based, regulator-led model. Without an overarching AI statute, the UK relies on five cross-cutting principles, including safety, transparency, fairness, accountability and contestability — guiding sector regulators such as the ICO, FCA, CMA and Ofcom. Emphasis is placed on proportionate oversight, regulatory sandboxes and assurance frameworks.

• United States: A fragmented, sector-driven approach. There is no federal AI law. Instead, federal agencies (FTC, NIST, FDA, CFPB) issue guidance or sector-specific rules and states (such as California and Colorado) enact AI and data-related laws. The Biden Administration’s 2023 Executive Order on Safe, Secure and Trustworthy AI directs federal agencies to develop standards around safety, transparency and accountability. Enforcement relies heavily on existing consumer protection, privacy and anti-discrimination laws rather than a dedicated AI statute.

Global Implications

China’s approach carries significance beyond its borders. By embedding political values and security considerations into its AI rules, China is shaping international debates on transparency, accountability and state control in AI governance. Other jurisdictions — particularly the EU with its AI Act and the UK with its principle-based framework — are likely to look to Beijing’s model when refining their own approaches.

Practical Implications for Businesses

As of late 2025, companies operating across China, the EU and the UK must prepare for increasingly fragmented compliance demands. In China, businesses should ensure algorithm filing, content labelling and government approvals are in place before launching or scaling AI systems. Adopting a compliance-by-design approach that addresses the most stringent obligations across jurisdictions is essential for global players to maintain operational flexibility and regulatory trust.

On 18 July 2025, CIETAC unveiled provisional Guidelines on the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Arbitration (the “AI Guidelines”). These guidelines represent the first normative framework on AI in arbitration published by an arbitral institution in both China and the Asia-Pacific. While not incorporated into the CIETAC Arbitration Rules, the AI Guidelines provide an important reference point for practitioners, arbitrators and parties as AI becomes increasingly prevalent in dispute resolution.

Potential Applications of AI in Arbitration

The AI Guidelines acknowledge various possible uses for AI in arbitral proceedings. They note that AI tools may assist with proofreading, translation and transcription of documents and hearing records, thereby improving efficiency in managing case materials. They may also provide drafting support for procedural orders and selected portions of arbitral awards, streamlining the work of tribunals. Beyond drafting, AI can be employed in managing documents and case files, helping to organise, retrieve and systematise large volumes of material in complex disputes.

The Guidelines further recognise that AI has potential in the collection, review and analysis of evidence, particularly in cases involving substantial technical or factual records. They also identify a role for AI in preparing witness statements and formulating cross-examination questions, supporting parties in hearing preparation. Finally, AI may serve as an auxiliary tool for conducting legal research and assisting with the selection of arbitrators, drawing on data-driven analysis to inform party or tribunal decisions. These examples underscore that AI is being positioned as an auxiliary tool, rather than a decision-maker, in the arbitral process.

Benefits and Risks of AI Use

The AI Guidelines adopt a balanced approach, recognising both the potential advantages of artificial intelligence and the risks associated with its application in arbitration. On the one hand, AI promises to increase efficiency by automating time-consuming tasks, enhancing the quality of drafting, improving the accuracy of data analysis and accelerating the review of large volumes of evidence. These benefits contribute not only to faster proceedings but also to a reduction in overall costs for the parties involved.

On the other hand, the Guidelines caution that the use of AI carries significant risks. Concerns include breaches of confidentiality and data security, inaccuracies or biases embedded in algorithms and the so-called “black box” problem, where the inner workings of AI models remain opaque and difficult to explain. These issues raise questions about transparency and accountability. In addition, there is the possibility of enforcement challenges, as courts or regulators may be hesitant to uphold arbitral awards where reliance on AI undermines confidence in the integrity of the decision-making process.

Foundational Principles

The guidelines rest on three overarching principles:

• Party Autonomy: Parties are free to determine the extent to which AI may be used, whether to allow or prohibit it and how disclosure of AI use should be handled.

• Auxiliary Role: AI may assist with procedural or technical tasks, but arbitral tribunals remain responsible for legal reasoning and the final award.

• Good Faith: Parties retain responsibility for the truthfulness and legality of submissions, regardless of whether AI tools have been employed.

Guidance for Arbitral Tribunals

Before adopting AI tools, tribunals are advised to:

• assess the necessity and proportionality of AI use;

• weigh efficiency gains against risks;

• evaluate the accuracy and security of the tool; and

• consider the broader regulatory framework in the relevant jurisdiction.

Importantly, tribunals must not allow AI use to compromise a party’s right to be heard and must independently analyse facts, apply the law and provide reasoning in their awards.

Recommended Risk Mitigation Measures

The AI Guidelines suggest a number of practical steps that parties, tribunals and institutions can adopt to minimise the risks associated with the use of artificial intelligence in arbitration. Parties are encouraged to address the issue at the contract stage by including express provisions in their arbitration agreements on whether AI may be used and if so, under what conditions. Tribunals, in turn, are advised to seek the parties’ views on AI during procedural orders or pre-hearing conferences, ensuring that its use is transparent and agreed upon from the outset of the proceedings.

The Guidelines also recommend reliance on CIETAC’s own secure platforms, particularly for services such as electronic filing and AI-assisted transcription, to safeguard confidentiality and data integrity. In addition, they underline the importance of ongoing training and education for arbitrators, counsel and parties, aimed at building a realistic understanding of AI’s capabilities, limitations and the broader regulatory framework governing its deployment.

Taken together, these measures are designed to establish confidence that while AI may be employed to enhance efficiency, its use remains controlled, proportionate and consistent with the principles of fairness and due process.

Broader Context and Outlook

The AI Guidelines reflect a wider international trend: while AI is increasingly relied upon for research, document review and factual analysis, it should not replace arbitral discretion or legal reasoning. The guidelines serve as a starting framework rather than a rigid rulebook, recognising that the rapid pace of AI development makes detailed prescriptive rules premature.

As China positions itself as a leader in both AI technology and international arbitration, CIETAC’s move may signal further institutional initiatives, both within China and across Asia, to regulate AI in dispute resolution.

Key Takeaways for Foreign Parties

• Foreign companies involved in China-related arbitration now have initial guidance on how AI may be incorporated into proceedings.

• Awards remain the product of tribunal reasoning; AI cannot substitute judicial discretion.

• Parties drafting arbitration clauses should consider expressly addressing AI use to avoid uncertainty.

• Foreign parties must be alert to China’s stringent data protection standards when deploying AI tools.

• CIETAC’s guidelines mirror global arbitration debates and will likely influence similar initiatives elsewhere.

Conclusion

The release of CIETAC’s AI Guidelines in July 2025 represents a landmark development at the intersection of AI regulation and arbitration practice. While provisional and non-binding, the Guidelines offer practical direction to parties, counsel and tribunals navigating the opportunities and risks of AI in arbitral proceedings. For foreign companies, the message is clear: AI will play a growing role in arbitration in China, but only within carefully drawn boundaries that preserve fairness, transparency and party autonomy.

HKIAC announced the launch of the Hub in May 2025, a platform that will operate both virtually and in person to bridge the gap between arbitrators and legal technology providers. The initiative aims to foster collaboration by providing arbitrators with structured, tailored access to digital tools that can enhance their efficiency, while giving technology providers a channel to present solutions directly to the arbitration community.

The Hub has been created as part of HKIAC’s commitment to innovation in arbitration. Its objectives are twofold. First, it is designed to identify the evolving needs of arbitrators and support them in integrating legal technology into their daily practice with institutional backing. Second, it leverages HKIAC’s extensive global network to facilitate knowledge sharing, developing curated content that encourages dialogue between practitioners and innovators.

Features of the Hub

The Hub will serve as more than just a showcase. It will host a programme of hands-on demonstrations, interactive workshops and training sessions, allowing arbitrators to test new technologies in practice. In parallel, technology providers will benefit from targeted exposure to users and valuable feedback on their products, creating a cycle of development and refinement that aligns with the needs of the arbitral process.

Participation and Access

Arbitrators listed on HKIAC’s Panel and List will be invited to register their interest in joining the Hub. Meanwhile, legal technology providers interested in being part of the 2025–2026 programme may apply by requesting a registration form via HKIAC’s dedicated email channel (thehub@hkiac.org). This structured registration process ensures that participants are vetted, and the programme remains focused on meaningful engagement.

Broader Impact

By creating the Hub, HKIAC is positioning itself as a pioneer among arbitral institutions in providing institutionalised support for legal technology and AI adoption. The platform is expected to strengthen links between the arbitration community and technology developers, ultimately enhancing efficiency, transparency and innovation in dispute resolution. For arbitrators, it represents an opportunity to stay at the forefront of digital transformation, while providers gain a unique entry point into one of the world’s most prominent arbitral markets.